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3TRANSPORT ON THE MAGDALENA
RIVER: OPPORTUNITIES,
ADVANTAGES, AND 
INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Daniel DePietro
Introduction
Colombia has been experiencing unprece-
dented economic growth, largely due to
increased security in the country, increased for-
eign direct investment, and prospering oil and
mining sectors. Colombia’s growth has brought
with it significant increases in import and export
activity, which have put a great strain on the
country’s underdeveloped transportation net-
work. Prohibitively high shipping costs have
revealed the country’s need for a modern-
ized transportation infrastructure and improved
multi-modal transportation1 systems. To address
these needs and ensure that Colombia remains
in a position to grow and prosper, investments
in transport are necessary. The development
of the Magdalena River as a transportation 
route represents such an investment and can
help address Colombia’s current transportation
problems.
The river was once considered the most
important passageway in Colombia, linking
areas such as Bogotá and Medellín with the
Caribbean ports at Barranquilla and Carta-
gena. It was used for almost all passenger and
freight traffic moving between Colombia’s inte-
rior and the Atlantic coast for most of the coun-
try’s history and was the sole communication
route between Bogotá and the world (Gilmore
and Harrison, p. 335). However, beginning 
in the nineteenth century, the river became
increasingly difficult to navigate, and it is now
scarcely used for transportation. 
Today, with a booming economy, a sig-
nificant decrease in rebel activity, and a realized
need for a multi-modal transportation system,
Colombia has begun planning the development
of the Magdalena River into a low-cost shipping
route. As with any major infrastructure project,
river development requires strong leadership
and effective planning to ensure the project is
1Multi-modal transport is the movement of goods
using at least two different means of transport, such as road,
river, air, and rail.
4completed on time and within budget. In addi-
tion, strong coordination between river devel-
opment and other infrastructure projects is nec-
essary to ensure that the river’s ports are well
connected to the country’s economic centers.
There have previously been many severe infra-
structure project delays in Colombia; and,
according to a September 2011 report in The
Economist, the biggest risk to current infra-
structure projects in Colombia is completing
them on time (“Bridging the Gaps”). Corruption
in government agencies continues to persist
as well. In response to these problems, the Agen-
cia Nacional de Infraestructura (ANI) (National
Infrastructure Agency) was created in 2012 to
facilitate efficient and successful infrastruc-
ture projects. However, the ANI was not given
control of the development of the Magdalena
River. Instead, Cormagdalena, a corporation cre-
ated by the Colombian government to manage
the waterway, is responsible for river develop-
ment. In its 20-year history, Cormagdalena
has been the focus of much criticism and has
faced difficulties accomplishing its goal of
improving river navigability.
Delays and missteps in river development
caused by lack of institutional leadership and
effective planning will severely hamper Colom-
bia’s progress. If transportation infrastruc-
ture is not improved in a timely fashion, high
shipping costs will lead to higher-priced
imports; an inability to export commodi-
ties, such as coal and oil, at a competitive 
price; and ultimately a slowdown in Colom-
bia’s growth. The development of the river can
address these problems by providing an alter-
native shipping route and increased cargo-
carrying capacity, thus driving down ship-
ping costs.
The purpose of this article is to analyze
why the development of the Magdalena River for
transportation will be beneficial and how this
can be accomplished. I discuss the river’s his-
tory, explore the economic advantages of river
development, and examine how Cormagdalena
has managed the waterway in the past. Finally,
I argue how Cormagdalena’s poor track record
and lack of leadership could severely hamper the
Magdalena River’s development and why the ANI
may be better suited to develop the waterway in
a timely, efficient, and effective way.
The Diminishing Role of
Transportation on the Magdalena
River
The Magdalena River basin, shown in
Figure 1, extends throughout Colombia for
nearly 1,600 km, beginning at Lake Magdalena
in the southern part of the country. From there,
the river flows 1,280 km northward and con-
verges with the Cauca River at Mompox, about
200 km from the Atlantic coast. The Mag-
dalena continues from Mompox and empties
into the ocean at Barranquilla, the third largest
industrial city in Colombia and an important
port.
Dividing the complex river into three sec-
tions makes it easier to understand. The Alto
(Upper) Magdalena extends 640 km from the
river’s headwaters to the city of Honda, where a
series of impassible rapids exists. The Alto Mag-
dalena is extremely difficult to navigate and has
seldom been used for transportation in the past
(Gilmore and Harrison, p. 335). The Bajo (Lower)
Magdalena extends from Honda to the coast
and can be split further into two sections: Honda
to Banco, where river navigation is seasonally dif-
ficult, and Banco to Barranquilla, where the river
is more easily navigable year-round. Between
Honda and Banco there exist many port towns,
including La Dorada, which has served as a
river port for goods bound for Bogotá, and Bar-
rancabermeja, home to Colombia’s largest oil
refinery. In addition to the river’s natural access
to the Atlantic port of Barranquilla, the Canal del
Dique provides a route to Cartagena Bay, Colom-
bia’s largest port. River development will occur
primarily on the Bajo Magdalena and it is this sec-
tion of the river that is the major focus of the
remainder of the article.
The navigability of the Magdalena River
began to suffer when steamboat navigation
gained popularity in the early nineteenth 
century. As Gabriel García Márquez wrote in 
The General in His Labyrinth, “This was the
time when the river had begun to change
course, with an irreparable disdain that would
become total abandonment by the end of the
century” (p. 94). Deforestation along the river’s
banks greatly increased after the arrival of the
steamboat, and once heavily forested areas were
transformed into open pastures (López, p. 49).
Figure 1
The Magdalena River Basin
Sources: Adapted by the author from “File:Colombia . . .”; “File:Rio Magdalena . . .”; and U.S. Geological
Survey.
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Continuing deforestation, along with poor agri-
cultural practices and mining along the river’s
banks, significantly accelerated soil erosion
rates, causing sedimentation, and changed the
natural course of the river (Restrepo et al., 
p. 217). This resulted in alterations in channel
depth and a decrease in river navigability to
the point where many parts of the river were
impassible. The port towns along the banks of
the river, such as La Dorada, Puerto Salgar,
and Puerto Berrío, suffered as river transport
declined. 
While the river was physically suffering
from sedimentation, the Magdalena River basin
and its inhabitants were subject to a much
different tragedy. Between the 1970s and 1990s,
a portion of the Bajo Magdalena, stretching from
Puerto Berrío to Banco, became the scene of an
escalating conflict. Guerilla and paramilitary
groups wrestled for control of the river’s port
towns, whose resources provided them funding.
In addition, the Magdalena River began to be
used for drug trafficking. The rebel presence sig-
nificantly decreased transportation safety along
the river, further discouraging the few individ-
uals who desired to use it to move cargo.
Increasing violence required the govern-
ment to focus its resources on fighting the
6rebels. Investment in transportation infrastruc-
ture was only 0.66 percent of GDP in 2002, a
mere fraction of the 3 percent of GDP that the
Inter-American Development Bank recom-
mends middle-income countries like Colom-
bia invest in such infrastructure (“Bases del 
Plan . . . ,” p. 198). By 2010, investment in infra-
structure had risen to 1.73 percent of GDP,
still more than a full percentage point below
what is recommended. However, only a por-
tion of this is available for river infrastructure
because Colombian law states that only public
funds can be used to improve maritime canal
access and maintain river channels, and only 65
percent of investment was public investment.
Regardless, little of the available money is
allocated toward river infrastructure. For exam-
ple, in 2007, 93 percent of public investment
was allocated toward highways, 4.5 percent for
airways, and less than 2 percent for waterways
(Salin and Mello). Such limited funding is not
enough to improve the navigability of the
river.
As a result of the problems of sedimenta-
tion, internal conflict, and lack of investment,
transportation on the Magdalena River is cur-
rently very difficult due to
• Unnavigability in certain areas
throughout the year
• An inability to navigate the river at
night
• Lack of signage and buoys to guide
those who do travel on the river
• No knowledge of river level, flow rates,
and other factors that help ships 
navigate
• An absence of port infrastructure to
serve the river
The end result of these problems has been a sig-
nificant decrease in the river’s cargo-carrying
capacity. The Magdalena, the river that was once
the leading transport route in Colombia, is now
used to transport less than 1.2 percent of cargo
(by weight) moving through the country.
Colombia’s Need for Transportation
Infrastructure
Colombia has had great economic success
in recent years without utilizing the Magdalena
River for transportation, as evidenced by its
5.9 percent growth in GDP in 2011. If an invest-
ment in river development is to be made, strong
evidence must exist to justify it.
The oil and coal industries are leading
Colombian economic expansion. Colombian oil
production grew by over 35 percent between
2008 and 2011 and has continued to grow in
2012. Coal production has been increasing at 15
percent per year (“Colombia Shipping . . . ,” 
p. 5). At the same time, foreign direct invest-
ment in these sectors is at an all-time high,
amounting to over 7.5 billion U.S. dollars2 in
2011, which is likely to continue to drive future
growth (Alsema). Transportation infrastructure
is extremely important to these sectors, because
most of the oil and coal produced in Colombia
is bound for export and requires transporta-
tion to coastal ports. These exports are increas-
ing, with coal and mineral exports increasing by
more than 75 percent since 2004 (including a
39 percent increase between 2010 and 2011) and
oil exports increasing by almost 20 percent
between 2010 and 2011 (“Colombia Oil . . . ,”
p. 12). However, transport costs are already
hurting the coal industry, as the lack of multi-
modal transportation adds an estimated 80 per-
cent to the cost of transporting coal (“Colombia
Energy . . .”).
In addition to oil and coal, Colombia’s total
exports increased by 21 percent between 2009
and 2010 and continue to rise. Eighty percent
of Colombian exports are shipped via ocean,
with most traveling through Atlantic ports
(“Colombia en Cifras . . . ,” p. 60). However,
the cost of exporting goods in Colombia is
extremely high when compared to other coun-
tries. The cost of exporting a cargo container
is over 35 percent higher in Colombia than in
other Latin American countries and is signifi-
cantly above the world average (World Bank
Data).
While increased exports have driven
Colombia’s economic growth, imports have
risen as well, increasing by 10.5 percent in 2010
and 21.5 percent in 2011 (“Colombia Ship-
ping . . . ,” p. 72). Most of these imports are
bound for the interior regions of Bogotá, Antio-
quia, Cundinamarca, and Magdalena, all of
which are touched by the Magdalena River. In
2011, the cost of importing goods was even
2All dollar amounts are in U.S. dollars for the remain-
der of the article.
7higher than the cost of exporting goods, at over
$2,800 per container, 43 percent higher than
the average cost of $1,600 per container in
other Latin American countries (World Bank
Data).
While the cost of shipping goods in Colom-
bia has been increasing steadily for many years,
these costs experienced an average increase of
40 percent between the years 2010 and 2011
as a result of the mounting pressures that
Colombia’s strong economic growth have put
on the country’s transportation infrastruc-
ture. The sharp increase in transportation costs
is alarming. Such high costs are due to poor
transportation infrastructure, a lack of multi-
modal transportation options, and the increased
volume of goods being traded that require trans-
port within the country. In fact, inadequate
transportation infrastructure is considered
the greatest hindrance to future growth in the
coal and oil sectors and threatens all Colombian
industries. The recent Colombian free trade
agreement with the United States will further
increase trade and put more pressure on an
already strained transport system. The Mag-
dalena River’s development can help alleviate
the problem of increasing shipping costs that,
if allowed to rise at such a rate, will impede eco-
nomic growth.
Advantages and Disadvantages of
River Development
There are four main options for transport-
ing bulk cargo in Colombia: road, rail, river, and,
to a lesser extent, pipelines. As of 2012, each
main transportation sector (road, rail, and river)
had a large infrastructure project either under
way or in the planning stage that could drive
down transport costs. All three projects, the
Ruta del Sol road project, the Carare rail proj-
ect, and the development of the Magdalena
River, accomplish the same goal: connecting
Colombia’s interior to the Atlantic coast. In
the following paragraphs, I compare these three
projects and the modes of transportation they
represent. 
The Ruta del Sol road project is the
largest road project ever attempted in Colom-
bia. This 1,000-km highway, managed by the
ANI, will connect Bogotá to the Caribbean port
of Santa Marta at an estimated cost of $2.6 bil-
lion (“Success Stories . . .”). The Carare rail
project, also managed by the ANI, will connect
existing portions of rail with new sections to
form a continuous railway from Colombia’s
interior to the coast. The 460-km rail project
is estimated to cost $1.8 billion (Beltrán).
The development of the Bajo Magdalena
includes the dredging of approximately 256 km
of river, the construction of dikes to control
water flow, and the implementation of navi-
gation aids. Unlike the other projects, river
development is not under control of the ANI,
but, as noted previously, of Cormagdalena. It
is estimated to cost $400 million (Quinn). This
is significantly less than the Ruta del Sol and
Carare projects but will accomplish the same
goals as these more expensive projects, namely
connecting Colombia’s interior to the Atlantic
coast. The river would, however, provide access
to not one but two major ports: Barranquilla
and Cartagena. Between 2009 and 2011, both
ports experienced significant increases in the
total tonnage moved through them, at 25
percent and 30 percent, respectively (“Colom-
bia Shipping . . . ,” p. 73). A significantly lower
development cost, as well as access to two
growing ports, gives the river major advantages
over other modes of transportation.
Analyzing the cost of development per
kilometer is necessary due to the differences
in physical size of the projects and provides
another perspective as to which is the most eco-
nomical. The Carare rail project is the least cost-
effective, at $4 million/km, followed by the Ruta
del Sol project, at a cost of $2.98 million/km.
River development is again the best option, at
$1.56 million/km for the 256 km of river that
would be dredged as part of the project. How-
ever, the 256 km of dredging will result in a con-
tinuous 1,000 km of the river becoming naviga-
ble. If looked at this way, the cost of making the
river navigable is only $440,000/km.
In addition to the benefit of lower cost,
river transport is more fuel-efficient than road
transport. This is due to the decreases in emis-
sions and fuel consumption that result from one
barge being able to carry the same load as
dozens, even hundreds, of highway trucks
(Kruse et al., p. 6). It has also been found that
river transport is more fuel-efficient than rail
transport. Studies comparing road, river, and
rail have also found river transport to have a
8lower risk of fatalities and injuries, fewer spills,
and a smaller overall environmental impact
(Kruse et al., p. 1).
Another advantage to improving river nav-
igability is that there is growing demand for
such a project. Although in recent years the
river has been utilized for the transportation
of approximately 2 million tons of cargo annu-
ally, a small fraction of the 180 million tons that
moved through Colombia in 2011, cargo trans-
port via the river increased by over 50 percent
between 2002 and 2009 (“Transporte en Cifras,”
p. 46). The growing hydrocarbon industry,
which includes oil and its byproducts, repre-
sented over 80 percent of cargo transported
on the Magdalena between 2007 and 2009,
whereas coal and minerals made up 25 per-
cent of the remaining non-hydrocarbon cargo.
Additionally, new contracts are currently being
awarded to develop new coal and oil extractive
operations within the Magdalena River basin.
Transport on the river is attractive to oil com-
panies, as the cost of transporting oil via water-
ways is approximately five times lower than
transport via pipelines in Colombia (“Colom-
bia Shipping . . . ,” p. 61). However, a lack of
investment into improving the navigability of
the river has restricted this industry, as well
as others, from using the river to its full poten-
tial. For example, in 2012 Impala International,
a logistics company that transports coal in
Colombia, invested in a fleet of 19 barges and
a tugboat in order to increase its ability to trans-
port cargo on the river. However, use of the
barges will be limited to the stretch from Bar-
rancabermeja to the Atlantic coast due to
unnavigability of the river beyond this point.
If the river were fully navigable, it is likely
that more investments, similar to Impala’s, will
be made and that the shipping industry will take
advantage of the river. 
Even though the Magdalena River has
many advantages over other forms of transporta-
tion, drawbacks to river transportation exist. The
main disadvantage is that the river does not pro-
vide the most direct route to Colombia’s eco-
nomic centers. Roads and railways can be built
to lead right into major cities, unlike the river.
With Bogotá 165 km and Medellín 190 km from
the closest port on the Magdalena, the river must
be developed as part of a multi-modal transporta-
tion system in order to be effective. The devel-
opment of these interconnected transport net-
works will require coordination of river develop-
ment with the many road and rail projects cur-
rently under way in Colombia.
Another disadvantage is that, once made
navigable, the river will need constant invest-
ment to stay navigable. Unlike road and rail
projects, which require less monitoring and
repair after initial installation, the river is
estimated to need $200 million over ten years
to ensure navigability after the initial $400 mil-
lion project is complete. Most of these funds
would be used to continue dredging in areas
prone to high sedimentation. However, even
with this additional cost, development of the
Magdalena is cheaper and more cost effective
than the road and rail projects. 
Yet another major concern of developing
the river is the possibility of natural disasters
that would affect river transportation. These dis-
asters include floods and droughts, which would
significantly raise or lower the depth of the river.
To mitigate these risks, the development of
the river must be planned in such a way that sys-
tems are in place to ensure that the navigabil-
ity of the river is not compromised in such
situations. 
The advantages of developing the Mag-
dalena River (low cost, fuel efficiency, and an
existing demand) all call for the pursuit of a
project to make the river navigable. The major
disadvantage is that the river must be developed
in conjunction with other types of transport.
This problem can be solved through effective
planning and strong collaboration, which can
ensure that the river is well connected to
Colombia’s economic centers and integrated
with other transportation systems. In order to
determine whether Cormagdalena is capable
of accomplishing this and leading the develop-
ment of the Magdalena River and whether it is
the best choice to do so, it is necessary to ana-
lyze the agency’s structure, functions, and
past projects.
Cormagdalena3
As part of the 1991 Colombian Constitu-
tion, the Corporación Autónoma Regional del
3Most of the information in this section is from Black-
man et al.
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omous Corporation of the Rio Grande de la 
Magdalena), or Cormagdalena, was created as
a self-governing corporation to manage the
Magdalena River. This unique organization is
the only regional autonomous corporation
(RAC) in Colombia that does not have control
over a particular province but rather control
over a body of water. Cormagdalena’s pur-
poses, as listed in the constitution and sum-
marized here, are to
• Improve river navigation, transporta-
tion, and port activities
• Work toward environmental conserva-
tion of the river and surrounding areas
• Manage hydropower generation and
distribution
• Regulate fishing and other renewable
natural resources
The agency is led by a director general and
a board of directors (BOD). The BOD is the main
administrative authority and consists of repre-
sentatives from the executive branch of govern-
ment, regional governments, national agencies,
and private corporations. The director general
serves as the corporation’s legal authority, is
elected by the BOD, and has limited power. He
or she must seek approval from the BOD for
all budgets, plans, programs, and staffing and
ensure that the board’s decisions and agree-
ments are carried out. Such an organizational
framework can lead to disagreements that ham-
per progress in achieving the agency’s goals.
Over the past ten years, the corporation
has been marred by failed projects and investi-
gations into its contracts and practices. In 2003,
Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office ordered the
suspension of Cormagdalena’s director gen-
eral and six other officials for irregularities in
the execution and performance of contracts
worth thousands of dollars (Pinzon). In 2005,
Cormagdalena made significant investments
in building the “Florentino Ariza,” a ship named
after the main character in Marquez’s Love in
the Time of Cholera, in hopes that it would
attract tourists to the river. However, the proj-
ect failed when the ship suffered engine damage
and began to leak. The Florentino Ariza has
remained stranded in Barrancabermeja for
several years, where it has begun to rust as its
fate remains to be determined. After a failed
attempt to dredge the Canal Del Dique in 2010,
it was found that the studies done to deter-
mine the feasibility of the project were inade-
quate. Furthermore, it was found that since
1997 Cormagdalena had paid for multiple stud-
ies on improving navigation without any results.
In addition to criticism about failed projects,
members of the BOD have been questioned
about possible conflicts of interest with Cormag-
dalena projects. For example, the Colombian
River Shipping Corporation, whose vice presi-
dent sits on the BOD, controls 80 percent of the
fleet that transports hydrocarbons on the river.
Some have accused him of trying to limit com-
petition in the shipping industry by opposing
the extension of dredging (“Aguas Turbias . . .”).
Cormagdalena’s failure to manage the
river became evident in 2010, when floods
caused by La Niña4 caused the displacement
of over more than 2 million individuals in the
Magdalena River basin. In response, the admin-
istration of Colombian President Juan Manuel
Santos attempted to take the agency in a new
direction, and officials called for the resigna-
tion of Cormagdalena’s Director General Juan
Gonzalo Botero. Feeling pressure from the BOD
to step down from his position after serving
only part of his term, Botero resigned in May of
2011 (Betín del Río). A new director general,
lawyer and former minister of Colombia’s
embassy in Spain, Augusto García Rodríguez,
was elected in September of 2011. Although
García has been more successful in working
with regional governors and has the support of
the BOD, it cannot yet be determined whether
his leadership will be enough to take Cor-
magdalena in a new direction.
Cormagdalena’s past leadership decisions
and project failures are not the only reasons the
corporation has not met its goals. Although the
corporation’s budget has increased in recent
years, for much of the previous decade it was
below $60 million. With so many responsibili-
ties, ranging from the management of power
generation to regulating fishing to land conser-
vation, the corporation’s funding is spread out
over many different areas. In 2009, less than
20 percent of the corporation’s budget was 
4La Niña is defined as cooler-than-normal sea-
surface temperatures in the central and eastern tropical
Pacific Ocean that have an impact on global weather 
patterns.
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allocated toward improving the navigability and
port infrastructure of the river. This repre-
sents a small fraction of the estimated $400 mil-
lion required for the Bajo Magdalena to be made
fully navigable.
The root of Cormagdalena’s problems,
however, can be linked to its organization as
an RAC. The corporation’s structure results in
it having very little autonomy due to the many
control mechanisms in place to ensure that it
acts in accordance with other national institu-
tions. For example, Cormagdalena must submit
annual action plans that are in agreement
with the President’s National Development Plan,
allowing the agency little room to pursue its
own endeavors. At the same time, the National
Planning Department must approve all invest-
ment projects. To ensure that the corporation
complies with national strategies, Colombia’s
control organizations can discipline RACs for
failure to implement plans. National authorities
also have some control over the salaries of
Cormagdalena staff. Such control results in
an organization that has little independence
to pursue projects that it feels would be bene-
ficial to the river. Although Cormagdalena is
supposed to be the authority on the Magdalena
River, it is not being given the ability to do so.
The exact purpose of the RACs, of which
Cormagdalena is 1 of 33, has changed over time.
When created in 1991, RACs were charged
with promoting development by arranging
financing for, building, and operating infrastruc-
ture. However, in 1993 Law 99 made environ-
mental management the main responsibility
of these organizations. Yet their role in infra-
structure was not completely removed, because
the law assigned departments, municipalities,
and RACs joint responsibility for developing
many types of infrastructure, including flood
control and water management systems. The
law also gave the Ministry of Environment the
role of overseeing and coordinating the activi-
ties of RACs.
Law 99 has resulted in multiple problems.
First, it assigns RACs responsibility for both
developing infrastructure and monitoring it
after development. With no outside monitoring
agency, incentives to ensure that projects are
successful and sustainable are minimal. The fail-
ure of the dredging project in the Canal del
Dique is one example of how such lack of mon-
itoring and accountability has impeded river
development.
A second problem was not caused by Law
99 but was exacerbated by it. The law has
required regional governments, RACs, and other
groups to work together on projects. This has
proved especially difficult for Cormagdalena,
because it shares jurisdiction over the river with
100 other groups. The roles and jurisdictions of
each of the different groups are often con-
fused, and Cormagdalena has not shown the
ability to effectively lead collaboration efforts.
Finally, the Ministry of Environment has
been unable to adequately oversee the RACs
or to promote national-regional coordination.
Lack of institutional coordination, due to lack
of leadership, has resulted in national organiza-
tions, local governments, and RACs working
independently and sometimes divergently. How-
ever, projects must converge and interconnect
to form a complete transportation system con-
sisting of river, road, and rail; unfortunately, evi-
dence shows that such collaboration is not com-
mon in RACs like Cormagdalena.
President Santos has stated that the RAC
system was “poorly conceived” and that many
are “mismanaged and corrupt” (quoted in
Molinksi). After the floods caused by La Niña,
the government took control of the 33 RACs
that operate in Colombia because of their fail-
ure to manage water resources and to miti-
gate the nation’s risk of flooding. Many of the
corporations were eliminated or merged
together as part of the takeover. However, Cor-
magdalena survived and is still in charge of
managing the Magdalena.
Why Cormagdalena survived must be
questioned. In the corporation’s 21 years of exis-
tence, the river’s navigability has not improved.
The BOD has led the corporation into failed
projects and has been plagued by corruption,
while doing little to improve river navigabil-
ity. The agency must act in accordance with the
executive branch’s National Development Plan,
and all investments should be approved by 
the National Planning Department. If the agency
must answer to multiple national organiza-
tions and ensure that the plans of those organ-
izations are implemented, why should these
national agencies not be in charge instead? Law
99 stated that the primary role of Cormagdalena
is to manage the environment, not develop
infrastructure. If development of the Magdalena
as a transport route is the goal, then a corpo-
ration whose main goal is to promote invest-
ment and improvement in infrastructure should
lead such a project.
Cormagdalena’s limitations have not gone
unnoticed. Senators, environmental agencies,
and the National Planning Department have
all called for the strengthening of the organiza-
tion to make it effective. Others have called
for its elimination. However, in October 2012
Cormagdalena began the prequalification
process for bidders seeking to enter a public-pri-
vate partnership to make the river navigable.
Although it is possible that Cormagdalena,
under the leadership of its new director general,
could break from its unsuccessful past and effec-
tively lead river development, Colombians must
take a critical look at Cormagdalena and deter-
mine whether a more capable organization
should lead such efforts.
The National Infrastructure Agency
(ANI)5
RACs, such as Cormagdalena, have been
described as “elements of a unitary system
and a national system of governance without
really falling into either category, a structure
that inevitably creates conflict and confusion.
RACs are neither regional administrative offices
of a national environmental ministry nor local
governments” (Blackman et al., p. 52). This
describes Cormagdalena well; and with its his-
tory of failed projects and corruption, the agency
should not be leading an effort to develop the
Magdalena River. River development will require
coordination with other infrastructure projects,
as it will be necessary to create connections
between the river’s ports and major economic
centers. For this reason and many others, the
newly created ANI should take over the respon-
sibilities of developing the Magdalena River from
Cormagdalena and lead the efforts to turn the
river into a major transportation route.
The ANI was created in 2012 to replace the
Instituto Nacional de Concesiones (INCO)
(National Institute of Concessions). The purpose
of replacing INCO with the ANI was to create
a clean slate for the government, because INCO
had become a corrupt agency. The ANI has been
populated with professionals who are experi-
enced in the way other infrastructure projects
are managed in Colombia. These individuals are
more educated than previous INCO employees
and are also paid more in order to reduce the
incentives for corruption. The goals of the
agency are to achieve greater efficiency, effec-
tiveness, and transparency in the administration
of the country’s infrastructure; to develop road,
rail, port, river, and air transportation infra-
structure; and to cultivate public-private part-
nerships. In announcing the new agency, Pres-
ident Santos stated, “for the first time, we
[Colombia] will have a technical and inde-
pendent entity that will be in charge of conduct-
ing serious, in-depth studies, and which will
be thinking about how we can make the big leap
to modernity in infrastructure” (“Government
Greenlights . . .”).
Giving the National Infrastructure Agency
responsibility for the development of the Mag-
dalena River is sensible. The ANI is better
equipped to manage an infrastructure project
than Cormagdalena, because it is already lead-
ing the largest road and rail projects in the
country, and it has 25 other road contracts
and multiple rail contracts under development.
Control of river development would allow the
ANI to integrate river development into its road
and rail projects and facilitate the creation of 
an interconnected, multi-modal transportation
system. In addition, the ANI is involved in dredg-
ing projects for the ports of Cartagena and 
Buenaventura. It makes sense to use the rela-
tionships with dredging companies and simi-
lar organizations that the ANI built when plan-
ning the dredging of these ports in planning the
development of the Magdalena River. Addi-
tionally, because the ANI is now in charge of
concessions for infrastructure projects, it is
likely that any plans Cormagdalena makes for
the development of the river would have to pass
through the ANI. Giving responsibility to the
ANI would increase institutional efficiency
and reduce the number of individuals involved
in river development, thus lowering the chance
of corruption along the way. By removing the
middleman that is Cormagdalena, the devel-
opment process would become more efficient
and more transparent. 
5Most of the information in this section is from Agen-
cia Nacional de Infraestructura’s “Plan de Acción 2012.”
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While Cormagdalena has begun the
process of seeking a partner to develop the Mag-
dalena River, the organization of public-pri-
vate partnerships and infrastructure projects
is what the ANI was created to do. The ANI is
better suited to lead the development of the
Magdalena River not only because infrastruc-
ture projects are its sole purpose but also
because the ANI will be better able to inte-
grate the development of the Magdalena River
into the interconnected, multi-modal trans-
portation network that Colombia desperately
needs. This is not to say that Cormagdalena
should not play some role in the river’s future,
because it has responsibilities that involve envi-
ronmental protection, resource allocation,
and hydropower generation on the river. How-
ever, river infrastructure development would be
more successful under the management of the
ANI. 
As the flamboyant 1966 presidential can-
didate Dr. Antonio Goyeneche once proposed,
“Rather than toil away our treasury fund to
build a road to the coast, we will take water,
sand, and cement, and pave the Magdalena
River, creating a motorway to the modern
world” (quoted in Ospina). Although his propos-
als were radical, the idea of utilizing the river
for transportation, as it was used throughout
Colombia’s past, was sound. The Magdalena
River provides a great opportunity for the coun-
try to invest in its future; and if a project to
make it navigable is successful, it will provide
many benefits to Colombia and help alleviate the
threat that rising transportation costs pose to
Colombia’s growth.
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